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ENDING THE CHARADE:
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SHOULD EXPRESSLY
ADOPT THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
STANDARD FOR ADA TITLE II AND RA
SECTION 504 DAMAGES CLAIMS
by: Derek Warden*
ABSTRACT
While the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) has been law for over
30 years, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to adopt a definitive standard for how plaintiffs win damages under Title II of that law. Further, while
the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) has been law for almost 50 years, the Fifth
Circuit has failed to announce any specific standard for how plaintiffs obtain
damages under that law as well. I previously wrote an article in the pages of
this journal that sought to “clarify” the Fifth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the
issue. In Fifth Indifference: Clarifying the Fifth Circuit’s Intent Standard for
Damages Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 7 Tex. A&M
L. Rev. Arguendo 1 (2019), I argued (1) that the Fifth Circuit should adopt
the “deliberate indifference” standard and (2) that no Fifth Circuit precedent
should be read as explicitly forbidding the adoption of that standard. My paper has seen great success in its downloads and its recent citation in a brief to
the Fifth Circuit. However, the Fifth Circuit has still failed to adopt any specific standard and continues to use phrases like “seem to have required” and
“something more than deliberate indifference.” Fortunately, what the Fifth
Circuit has said and what it has done have been two different things. In reality,
the Fifth Circuit has been using nothing more, less, or different than a standard deliberate indifference analysis. Thus, the “seem to have required more
than deliberate indifference” standard is a mere charade. This charade should
now be abandoned, and the Fifth Circuit should explicitly adopt the deliberate
indifference standard. That standard being (1) a defendant knew of facts that
presented a substantial risk of harm to an ADA or RA right and (2) the actor
or entity failed to act appropriately on that risk.
To make this argument, this Article is divided as follows. Part I discusses
the historical and doctrinal background of the ADA and the RA. Part II discusses how other circuits have addressed the issue of damages actions under
Title II of the ADA and the RA. Part III discusses the Fifth Circuit’s relevant
jurisprudence. Part IV then explains why the Fifth Circuit should explicitly
adopt deliberate indifference. Finally, Part V briefly argues why lower courts
and any individual panels of the Fifth Circuit could ignore the “something
more than deliberate indifference” standard and explicitly adopt ordinary “deliberate indifference.”

https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V9.I2.4
* J.D., G.D.C.L., LL.M., S.J.D. (CDT), Attorney at Law, Career Law Clerk to
Justice Piper Griffin of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The views expressed herein are
my own. Special thank you is given to the Drastata family of New Braunfels, Texas.
They graciously let me stay with them for an extended period of time after I evacuated New Orleans due to Hurricane Ida. The bulk of this article was written while I
was in their home.
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DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND

A. In General
As I have said before, the history of disability discrimination is filled with horror and torment.1 At the same time, however, it provides
some of the greatest examples of hope and societal reconciliation in
human existence.2
1. Derek Warden, Disability Rights and the Louisiana Constitution, 48 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 578, 580 (2021) [hereinafter Disability Rights].
2. Id.
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Long before the United States existed, some ancient people accommodated those with serious disabilities; at other times, however, some
sought to eliminate those with disabilities entirely.3 Neanderthals
cared for individuals who were born with serious illnesses or had developed impairments from war, childbirth, or other aspects of life.4 On
the other hand, ancient Greeks executed those with disabilities.5 Even
Aristotle called for the execution of children with impairments.6
After the birth of Christianity, the concept that sin caused disabilities largely vanished, though other aspects of disability discrimination
remained. Certain conditions were considered signs of demonic possession, and others caused individuals to be shunned from society.
Homes, public spaces, and entire occupational fields were inaccessible
to individuals with disabilities.
In both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United States
incarcerated those with disabilities in massive institutions.7 In these
places, due to society’s neglect and indifference, individuals suffered
extreme abuse, neglect, sexual assault, and other torturous treatment.8
In the twentieth century, the United States began its eugenics
craze.9 That movement sought to eliminate all those born with disabilities from the gene pool.10 In the name of compassion and science,
thousands of individuals were forcibly sterilized and institutionalized.11 The United States Supreme Court approved this practice in
Buck v. Bell—a decision that remains good law to this day.12
But society, especially within the United States, began to change.
State and federal legislatures began passing laws to address the needs
3. E.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding eugenics sterilization
laws).
4. Andrew Curry, Ancient Bones Offer Clues to How Long Ago Humans Cared
for the Vulnerable, NPR (June 17, 2020, 1:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goats
andsoda/2020/06/17/878896381/ancient-bones-offer-clues-to-how-long-ago-humanscared-for-the-vulnerable [https://perma.cc/V3QN-ZXHH].
5. Disability Rights, supra note 1, at 580.
6. John F. Muller, Disability, Ambivalence, and the Law, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 469,
481 (2011).
7. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 462 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. See Willowbrook: The Last Great Disgrace (WABC-TV television broadcast
1972) (documenting and exposing horrible conditions in asylums); see also Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 92–93 (1984) (describing awful treatment in a mental health asylum).
9. For a very good discussion about eugenics in American history, see VICTORIA
F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH
OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 13 (2008).
10. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461–62 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
11. Derek Warden, Ex Tenebris Lux: Buck v. Bell and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 51 U. TOL. L. REV. 57, 62 (2019).
12. Id. at 57.
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of those with disabilities.13 The two most pertinent federal laws are
the Rehabilitation Act of 197314 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act.15
B. The ADA and RA
The RA is omnibus legislation that covers a large swath of federal
programs and human life. Tacked onto the end of the law is what is
now known as § 504.16 Section 504 prohibits discrimination against
people with disabilities by entities that receive federal financial assistance.17 While the law is fairly popular today, it was controversial
when initially enacted.18 Indeed, the regulations to enforce that law
were not implemented until mass protests broke out across the nation.19 The longest of these protests lasted several weeks and became
known as the 504 Sit-in.20 Interestingly enough, these protests gave
practical relevance to one key aspect of disability discrimination: it
results most often from neglect and indifference as opposed to illwill.21 Once public attention turned to the protests, the regulations
were signed.22
But the RA, while many believed it would cause a monumental
shift in society, failed to live up to its lofty goals. It failed for a number
of reasons that are borne out by the prima facie case for § 504
claims.23 While it could be articulated in a number of ways, the prima
facie RA claim requires that (1) a plaintiff must have a disability (2)
the plaintiff must be otherwise qualified for the service, program, or
activity of an entity (3) the entity must be a recipient of federal financial assistance (4) the plaintiff must have suffered discrimination and
(5) the disability must have been the sole cause of the discrimination.
Many public entities, private employers, and private entities never received federal aid and were thus not bound by the law. Further, while
13. Virtually every state in the union has a law that meets or exceeds various protections found in the ADA. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 368 n.5 (2001).
14. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
15. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, 47 U.S.C. § 255).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
17. Id. § 794(a).
18. Julia Carmel, Before the A.D.A., There Was Section 504, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/us/504-sit-in-disability-rights.html [https://
perma.cc/5THH-744M].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985).
22. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
413, 427 n.78 (1991).
23. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
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it is largely irrelevant today,24 the causation standard seemed very
high.25 Thus, something else was needed. That something else would
become the ADA.26
What became clear is that this new law needed to address discrimination resulting from intentional conduct as well as neglect, inaction,
inaccessibility, and the disparate impact of otherwise neutral laws and
policies.27 It needed a lower standard of “causation.”28 Moreover it
needed to prohibit discriminatory conduct outside of that perpetrated
by recipients of federal financial assistance.29 It needed to address
healthcare and voting as well as virtually all actions of public entities,
private entities, walkways, integration, unjustified institutionalization,
education, and more.30
This sweeping legislation became the ADA. Divided into five Titles,
the law governs virtually all areas of life for people with disabilities.
Title I concerns employment discrimination.31 Title II deals with public entities.32 Title III prohibits discriminatory practices in places of
public accommodation.33 Title IV is concerned with telecommunication.34 Finally, Title V is a sort of storage shed for the law that touches
on several other topics far outside the scope of this article.35
Because this Article is concerned with damages actions, it is focused
on Title II of the ADA. Damages claims under Title I are well established. Title III does not allow for damages claims.36 Further, “damages” claims are essentially irrelevant to Titles IV and V.37
In order to bring any claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff
must establish the prima facie case. While the parts may be stated in
several ways, a decent outline is as follows: (1) the plaintiff has a disability under the ADA; (2) the plaintiff was otherwise qualified for the
service program or activity; (3) the plaintiff suffered exclusion from
24. Silver v. City of Alexandria, 470 F. Supp. 3d 616, 621 (W.D. La. 2020) (noting
the distinction has become largely irrelevant).
25. See Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that
courts apply a higher causation standard for § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act than they
do for the ADA).
26. Derek Warden, Four Pathways of Undermining Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 42 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 559 (2020).
27. See id. at 558.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (discussing the purposes and findings of the ADA).
31. Id. §§ 12111–12117.
32. Id. §§ 12131–12165.
33. Id. §§ 12181–12189.
34. 47 U.S.C. § 225.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–12213.
36. Granted, the Attorney General may seek civil penalties and damages on behalf of individuals under Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2); 28 C.F.R. § 36.504(a).
37. I say essentially because Title V contains the provision that purports to abrogate state immunity for lawsuits (including damages actions) under the other relevant
titles of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12202.
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the entity’s program, service, or activity, or was otherwise discriminated against by a public entity; and (4) that discrimination was by
reason of their disability.38
Further, to win damages against public entities, every circuit that
has addressed the issue agrees that the discriminatory conduct must
be intentional.39 But this is where the agreement stops. To win damages against public entities, most circuits now say that a plaintiff can
prove intentional discrimination by a showing of “deliberate indifference.”40 This means (1) a government actor had knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to an ADA or RA right and (2) that actor failed
to act appropriately on that risk.41 Because the RA and Title II claims
are virtually identical, they are often interpreted together.42
It is said that two circuits may have adopted something higher than
deliberate indifference.43 The First Circuit has required a showing of
animus or ill-will.44 The other is the Fifth Circuit, which has said the
circuit “seem[s] to have required” something more than deliberate indifference.45 At other times, it has expressly said (in possible dicta)46
that it requires something more than deliberate indifference.47
The Fifth Circuit’s uncertainty has led to a great deal of confusion.48
It has also presented a potential circuit split. However, as will be
shown below, this confusion and circuit splitting is totally unnecessary.
First, while it has at times claimed to require something more than
deliberate indifference, the Fifth Circuit has never used something
more than deliberate indifference as a practical matter.49 No Fifth Circuit case would have turned out differently at the appellate level had
the circuit court simply applied ordinary deliberate indifference.50
Further still, “deliberate indifference” is a much better fit than any
other potential test, whether it be higher, lower, or otherwise distinct.51 Finally, it is possible to read Fifth Circuit precedent as approv38. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
39. See discussion infra Parts II, III.
40. See discussion infra Part II.
41. See discussion infra Part II.
42. See Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2001).
43. Lacy v. Cook Cnty., 897 F.3d 847, 862 n.33 (7th Cir. 2018) (collecting sources
and noting differing standards in the First Circuit and Fifth Circuit).
44. See discussion infra Subsection II.A.
45. Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of the La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 575 (5th
Cir. 2018).
46. See discussion infra Part V.
47. Phillips ex rel. J.H. v. Prator, No. 20-30110, 2021 WL 3376524, at *2 (5th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2021).
48. Derek Warden, Fifth Indifference: Clarifying the Fifth Circuit’s Intent Standard
for Damages Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 7 TEX. A&M L.
REV. ARGUENDO 1, 4 (2019) [hereinafter Fifth Indifference].
49. See discussion infra Part III.
50. See discussion infra Part III.
51. See discussion infra Part IV.
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ing or allowing adoption of ordinary deliberate indifference.52 Thus,
as will become evident below, the “something higher than deliberate
indifference” standard espoused by some panels of the Fifth Circuit is
simply a charade that has led to unnecessary litigation, confusion, and
harm to the law.53 The Fifth Circuit should abandon it.
II. HOW OTHER CIRCUITS HAVE ADDRESSED ADA
DAMAGES CLAIMS

AND

RA

This Part examines the jurisprudence from all other U.S. circuit
courts to have addressed the issue of which standard of intent individuals must meet to win damages against entities for violations of Title
II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA.54 This survey sets the stage for
the analysis in Part III, which further examines the jurisprudence of
the Fifth Circuit. As is evident from this Part, the other circuits began
adopting “deliberate indifference” by playing a game of “telephone,”55 but they have since given additional reasons for adopting
that standard.56 I provide further elaboration on those reasons later in
this Article.57
A. The First Circuit’s Stand-Alone Jurisprudence
The First Circuit has had multiple opportunities to address how
plaintiffs may obtain damages under Title II of the ADA or § 504 of
the RA.58 While some may argue that the First Circuit has not
adopted a higher standard than deliberate indifference, it certainly
has. The First Circuit has, on multiple occasions, limited damages (or
denied them outright) where there was no evidence ‘‘of economic
harm or animus toward the disabled.”59 For example, where a teacher
failed to produce evidence of outright “intentional discriminatory ani52. See discussion infra Part V.
53. See discussion infra Part III.
54. . . . at the time of the writing and editing of this Article, that is. Further, while
district courts in other circuits have also adopted deliberate indifference, for purposes
of this Article, I focus on the decisions of the relevant courts of appeals. See Smith v.
N.C. Dep’t of Safety, No. 1:18CV914, 2019 WL 3798457, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 13,
2019) (noting district court cases from the Fourth Circuit); Budd v. Summit Pointe,
No. 1:19-cv-466, 2020 WL 1049838, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 2020); Reed v. Illinois,
119 F. Supp. 3d 879, 884–85 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.
Supp. 3d 250, 279 (D.D.C. 2015).
55. Brief of Appellant at 29, Phillips ex rel. J.H. v. Prator, No. 20-30110, 2021 WL
3376524, (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2021), 2020 WL 2071111, at *29.
56. See discussion infra Part II (examining the reasons given for adopting deliberate indifference).
57. Indeed, this Article further elaborates on the reasons I gave in my previous
article on the same subject.
58. See Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 125–27 (1st Cir. 2003) (examining the availability of damages under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA);
see also Carmona–Rivera v. Puerto Rico, 464 F.3d 14, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2006) (same).
59. Carmona–Rivera, 464 F.3d at 17.
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mus”60 and admitted that she had not suffered “any economic damages,”61 she could not make out a claim for intentional discrimination.
Quite frankly, the First Circuit has given little reasoning for this extremely high standard.62 Furthermore, this standard, as explained
more fully in Part IV, is in opposition to the text, history, purposes,
and practical realities of the ADA and RA. As such, while I call on
the Fifth Circuit to expressly adopt ordinary deliberate indifference, I
likewise do so for the First Circuit. Though, unlike the Fifth Circuit,
the First Circuit will certainly need an en banc panel or Supreme
Court decision to overturn its prior rulings. No other circuit, not even
the Fifth, has agreed with the First Circuit’s standard.
B. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit’s clearest adoption and articulation of its “deliberate indifference” standard is found in Loeffler v. Staten Island University Hospital.63 In that case, the plaintiff’s husband went to a
hospital for surgery and then had to stay in said hospital.64 Both
spouses had hearing impairments and needed interpreters or other
auxiliary aids.65 The hospital knew the plaintiff and her husband
needed such accommodations and failed to provide them.66 Instead,
their children had to interpret.67 The plaintiffs sued under various
laws, including the ADA and RA.68
The relevant question was whether the plaintiffs had shown that the
failure to provide interpreters was the result of intentional discrimination.69 In analyzing the issue, the circuit made several key statements
and holdings. First, ADA and RA plaintiffs may obtain damages by a
showing of intentional discrimination.70 Second, intentional discrimination can be shown by establishing “deliberate indifference” on the
part of the defendant.71 This means that one need not show ill will or
animus.72 Finally, mere bureaucratic inaction is not sufficient.73
While the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence of outright animus, they certainly produced evidence of deliberate indifference.74
Most importantly, while the plaintiffs did not allege that they had
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 17–18 (failing to discuss why it is continuing this very high standard).
Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 276.
Id.
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pointed out any specific violation of the ADA or RA, what is clear is
that the plaintiffs made several attempts to obtain an interpreter from
the hospital and that the requests had been “laughed” off.75
Therefore, to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs had produced sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude (1) the staff at
the hospital knew of discrimination against the plaintiff and her husband and (2) the hospital failed to take remedial action.76
C. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit did not explicitly adopt the deliberate indifference standard for ADA and RA damages claims until 2013 in S.H. ex
rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion School District.77 There, the plaintiff was
a schoolchild who had been misdiagnosed as having a disability and
placed in special education.78 Her mother alleged that this violated
various laws, including the RA and ADA.79 The relevant question was
whether the plaintiff had produced evidence showing a genuine issue
of material fact as to intentional discrimination.80
To answer that question, however, the court had to first decide
which standard of intentional discrimination applied to ADA and RA
claims for damages.81 The court acknowledged that most circuits had
already adopted deliberate indifference.82 Further, the court reasoned
that the deliberate indifference model was better suited for ADA and
RA claims than any other standard.83 First, it is consistent with the
general understanding that the ADA and RA were designed to address discrimination resulting from indifference and neglect, as well as
animus or ill will.84 Second, because the deliberate indifference standard requires some level of knowledge, it is in keeping with the overarching contract law principle that governs Spending Clause
legislation (which the RA is)—that damages should only be awarded
when a defendant had knowledge of a violation.85
While the Third Circuit reasoned that knowledge is required to
award damages, it did not hold that a plaintiff must tell the defendant
of the violation or point out any specific clause of the ADA or RA
75. Id. at 276–77.
76. Id. at 276.
77. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 263–64 (3d Cir.
2013).
78. Id. at 251.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 265.
81. Id. at 260 (“Appellants argue that no such showing [of intentional discrimination] is required. We have not yet spoken on this issue.”).
82. Id. at 263.
83. Id. at 264.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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that has been violated.86 Rather, it is enough that the defendant had
knowledge of the facts that violate the law.87
According to the Third Circuit, the plaintiffs could not meet the
burden of showing deliberate indifference for several reasons.88 Most
notably, the child’s mother agreed to the placement in special education; when the school discovered the child had no disability, it immediately removed her from special education.89 Thus, the plaintiff could
not prove “(1) knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially likely to be violated (i.e., knowledge that S.H. was likely not
disabled and therefore should not have been in special education) and
(2) failure to act despite that knowledge.”90
D. The Seventh Circuit
In 2018, the Seventh Circuit officially adopted the ordinary deliberate indifference standard in Lacy v. Cook County.91 As relevant to
this Article, the case involved five wheelchair users who sued a county
and sheriff for damages for failure to have accessible features and
other accommodations under the RA and ADA in courthouses.92 The
technical question was whether the district court had improperly relied on its own findings of fact to grant partial summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, instead of facts determined by a jury.93 In the
course of answering that question, the Seventh Circuit had to determine whether deliberate indifference was the best option for judging
ADA Title II and RA damages claims.
The circuit court, following the lead and analysis of the various
other courts, found the ordinary deliberate indifference model to be
the most appropriate standard.94 It did so because the various other
circuits had adopted it95 and because the deliberate indifference
model better served the general purposes of the ADA and RA in addressing discrimination resulting from mere indifference or benign
neglect, as well as animus or ill will.96 The test announced was “the
two-part standard applied by most other courts, ‘requiring both (1)
86. Id. at 265–67 (discussing the requirements for a damages award).
87. Id. at 265 (“[K]nowledge that [plaintiff] was likely not disabled and therefore
should not have been in special education . . . .”).
88. Id. at 266.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 265 (emphasis in original).
91. Lacy v. Cook Cnty., 897 F.3d 847, 863 (7th Cir. 2018).
92. Id. at 851.
93. Id. at 852.
94. Id. at 863.
95. Id. at 862.
96. Id. at 863.
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“knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially
likely,” and (2) “a failure to act upon that likelihood.”’”97
E. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit expressly adopted the deliberate indifference
standard for ADA Title II and § 504 RA claims in Meagley v. City of
Little Rock.98 In that case, a zoo patron flipped her scooter after she
ran over a bridge that was not compliant with the ADA.99 As relevant
to this Article, the Eighth Circuit was tasked with deciding what standard of intent applied to ADA and RA damages claims.100
The Eighth Circuit properly rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
she did not need to show intent.101 Further, the circuit agreed with
virtually all other circuits to have decided the issue that deliberate
indifference was the proper standard of intent in ADA and RA claims
for damages.102 The reasons for adopting the ordinary deliberate indifference standard were straight forward. The ADA was modeled on
the RA, which in turn was based on Spending Clause legislation
known as Title VI.103 Title VI has long required some knowledge for
the defendant to be cast in damages.104 Further, the deliberate indifference model does not require ill will or animus, but rather deliberate
indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its questioned policies would likely result in a violation of federal law.105 This rule is
essentially the same as that used by other circuits: (1) knowledge of a
substantial risk of harm to an ADA or RA right and (2) failure to act
appropriately despite that risk.
The court held that the plaintiff did not meet that standard because
the zoo had properly evaluated the bridge, found no issues with it,106
and lacked knowledge of any risk to rights under the ADA or RA,107
and it never had a patron overturn his scooter before.108 Further,
upon finding out that it was in violation of the ADA, the zoo acted
appropriately by blocking off the bridge and fixing it.109
97. Id. (first quoting S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248,
263 (3d Cir. 2013); then quoting Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
98. Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011).
99. Id. at 387.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 388.
102. Id. at 389 (discussing actions by other circuits).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Barber ex rel. Barber v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222,
1228–29 (10th Cir. 2009)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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F. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has long held that damages are allowed under
Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA.110 That circuit calls the applicable doctrine its mens rea standard for § 504 claims. The appropriate mens rea is intentional discrimination, which can be proven by a
showing of “deliberate indifference.”111 That test is the same in the
Ninth Circuit as in the others: “knowledge that a harm to a federally
protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that
likelihood.”112 Though, the Ninth Circuit has also expressly said that
mere bureaucratic neglect is not sufficient.113 Like the other circuits,
the Ninth Circuit expressly adopted the deliberate indifference standard because it “is better suited to the remedial goals of Title II of the
ADA than is the discriminatory animus.”114 For example, deliberate
indifference could be shown where a county court failed to provide
real time transcription at a marriage dissolution hearing despite repeated requests for such accommodations.115
G. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit expressly adopted the deliberate indifference
standard for ADA and RA damages claims more than two decades
ago in Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corporation.116 There, an individual
with mobility impairments needed accommodations at his technical
school.117 The relevant question on appeal was whether the trial court
had improperly failed to give a jury instruction as to the need for the
plaintiff to show proof of intentional discrimination.118
In deciding the issue, the Tenth Circuit determined that it would
join virtually all other courts that had reached the issue, holding that
plaintiffs must prove intentional discrimination to win damages under
the RA.119 Further, it held that “intentional discrimination [could] be
inferred from a defendant’s deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its questioned policies would likely result in a
110. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing prior cases
applying deliberate indifference).
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001)).
113. Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that
“some not uncommon bureaucratic inertia as well as some lack of knowledge and
understanding about the DOJ Manual’s requirements” does not constitute intentional
discrimination).
114. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139.
115. Id. at 1140–41.
116. Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999).
117. Id. at 1149–50.
118. Id. at 1152.
119. Id. at 1153.
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violation of federally protected rights.”120 Because the district court
failed to provide this instruction, the case had to be retried.121
H. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit expressly adopted the deliberate indifference
standard for ADA and RA damages claims in Liese v. Indian River
County Hospital.122 There, a patient and her husband sued a hospital
because it failed to provide them sign language interpreters for their
serious hearing impairments in violation of several laws, including the
RA.123
The main question on appeal was “whether the defendant’s ‘deliberate indifference,’ if proven, is sufficient to establish intentional discrimination under § 504 of the RA.”124 The answer, according to the
circuit, was yes.125 The reasons were rather straightforward. On the
one hand, most other circuits had also adopted it.126 On the other, the
knowledge requirement of the deliberate indifference standard fit well
with the general rule applicable to Spending Clause legislation that
damages cannot be awarded absent knowledge of a violation.127 Further, it also fit well with the general understanding of the ADA and
RA that both statutes were meant to address discrimination that resulted not just from animus or ill will but other sources as well (e.g.,
neglect, indifference, and so forth).128
The court held that there was “ample evidence” that would allow a
reasonable jury to find the hospital and its employees were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ rights.129 For example, one doctor
was informed of the plaintiffs’ need for interpreters, and that doctor
laughed at one plaintiff and “made exaggerated facial movements
when ask[ed] whether she could read lips.”130
One minor point about the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion131: its discussion of actual knowledge, at first glance, suggested that a plaintiff
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 336 (11th Cir. 2012).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 344–45 (recognizing the circuit had yet to decide the issue).
126. Id. at 345.
127. Id. at 347.
128. Id. at 348.
129. Id. at 351.
130. Id.
131. There is another point that is not entirely relevant to this Article, so I have
elected to discuss it in a footnote. The Eleventh Circuit also held that the plaintiff
must identity some “policy maker” who failed to act appropriately, and it appears to
have rejected a strict vicarious liability standard. Id. at 349. Quite frankly, this rule
should be abandoned for reasons evident from the Liese opinion itself. First, it seems
that the Eleventh Circuit is the only one to have adopted it. Id. at 349 n.10. Second, it
is in opposition to the fact that the ADA and RA are generally considered vicarious
liability laws. Id. (noting the respondeat superior nature of these laws). Third, it seems
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must inform a defendant of the specific violation under the ADA or
RA, such as which clause the conduct violated.132 However, because
the plaintiffs did not cite specific provisions of the RA in this case—
and because the circuit found that there were sufficient factual issues
to preclude summary judgment—it seems that this face value reading
is incorrect. Rather, the actual notice requirement is nothing more
than a requirement that the defendant know of facts that place it on
notice of a substantial likelihood of harm to a federally protected
right.133
I. The General Rule from the Other Circuits
Based on the foregoing, the general rule for awarding damages
claims against defendants under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the
RA is as follows: first, plaintiffs may obtain such compensatory damages; and, second, this can only be done through a showing of deliberate indifference. This requires proof that (1) a defendant knew of facts
that presented a substantial likelihood of harm to an ADA or RA
right and (2) the defendant failed to act appropriately on that risk.
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S JURISPRUDENCE
A. Delano–Pyle v. Victoria County
In Delano–Pyle v. Victoria County,134 the plaintiff was involved in a
car accident.135 When the police arrived at the scene, he informed the
deputies that he had a hearing impairment;136 the deputies continued
to perform various sobriety tests on him, though it was clear that he
had trouble understanding the deputies’ instructions.137 No interpreter
was provided.138 Further, when he was arrested and interrogated, his
Miranda rights were spoken to him, and it was unclear if he understood them.139
to undermine the broad remedial purposes of the ADA and RA discussed throughout
this Article. Fourth, the reasons given by the Eleventh Circuit for purportedly rejecting vicarious liability may have relied on too strong of a comparison between the
RA and other contract law-based Spending Clause legislation without giving due regard to the purposes of the RA and ADA—a point that the Eleventh Circuit was
close to recognizing itself. Id. at 347 n.9. Fifth, the circuit’s definition of a policy maker
in this context seems to be very broad such that a distinct rule requiring identification
of a policy maker may ultimately be completely useless. Id. at 350–51 (applying the
definition to an individual doctor).
132. Id. at 348 (discussing actual notice).
133. See id. at 351 (applying deliberate indifference standard to the factual
evidence).
134. Delano–Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 567 (5th Cir. 2002).
135. Id. at 570.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. (discussing tests and procedures law enforcement performed at the
scene of the accident).
139. Id. at 571, 576.
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The circuit court was tasked with, among other things, deciding
whether the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to support his
claim of intentional discrimination.140 Without any analysis, the court
declared that there is “no deliberate indifference standard” applicable
to claims under the ADA but that discrimination by public entities
had to be intentional.141 Granted, as explained elsewhere and below,
this statement may be misleading.142 The court further held that the
facts of the case supported a finding of intentional discrimination.143
However, the facts presented in Delano–Pyle are nothing more,
less, or different than those in a standard deliberate indifference case
that could be found in any other circuit to have adopted that standard.144 The officer knew the individual had a disability and had a
duty to accommodate. The officer knew of facts that presented a substantial likelihood of harm to the plaintiff’s rights. And yet, the officer
failed to act appropriately.
B. Perez v. Doctors Hospital at Renaissance, Ltd.
The plaintiffs in Perez v. Doctors Hospital145 had hearing impairments and needed auxiliary aids.146 While making numerous trips to
the defendant hospital for their daughter’s cancer treatment, the
plaintiffs were denied these accommodations.147 The plaintiffs made
several requests for auxiliary aids, and the hospital failed to provide
those accommodations.148
In ruling that the plaintiffs had produced sufficient evidence such
that there existed genuine issues of material fact,149 the panel also
noted that (1) damages under the RA150 can only be given upon a
showing of intentional discrimination151 and (2) it did not need to specifically decide what standard of intent was applicable.152
Nonetheless, taking Perez at face value, it seems the panel applied
ordinary deliberate indifference. The evidence supported the allegations that individuals at the hospital knew of facts that presented substantial risks of harm to ADA and RA rights and that they failed to
140. Id. at 572.
141. Id. at 575.
142. Fifth Indifference, supra note 48, at 10–11; see discussion infra Part V.
143. Delano–Pyle, 302 F.3d at 575–76.
144. See discussion supra Part II.
145. Perez v. Drs. Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd., 624 F. App’x 180, 180 (5th Cir. 2015).
146. Id. at 182.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 182, 185.
149. Id. at 182 (noting standard for summary judgment).
150. The ADA claims were based on Title III, and as such, no damages claims were
allowed under those claims. Id. at 182–83 (discussing plaintiffs’ Title III claims).
151. Id. at 184.
152. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL202.txt

452

unknown

Seq: 16

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

10-MAR-22

14:15

[Vol. 9

act appropriately on those risks.153 Furthermore, this decision is on
virtually all fours with the Second Circuit’s Loeffler opinion, discussed
above, which also dealt with accommodations for hearing impaired
individuals in a hospital.154 Therefore, this case once again presents a
situation where explicit application of deliberate indifference would
not have changed anything aside from making the law clearer.
C. Miraglia v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Museum
In Miraglia v. Board of Supervisors,155 the plaintiff sought access to
shopping centers below a state museum.156 These shops were owned
by the museum and rented out as a source of revenue.157 However,
the shops were not accessible to those in wheelchairs.158 During trial
and on appeal, no one doubted that the shops were inaccessible.159 On
appeal, the circuit was tasked with deciding whether the plaintiff had
produced evidence of intentional discrimination.160
In answering that question in the negative, the court first held that
“actual notice” of a violation is required to prove intent.161 Second, it
held that the defendants in the lawsuit had never been aware of any
violation but had effectively been guilty of bureaucratic neglect.162
At first glance, it appears that the Miraglia “actual notice” rule requires a plaintiff to pinpoint specific provisions of the ADA or RA
they claim were violated. However, this cannot be the case. In other
cases decided by the Fifth Circuit to have found sufficient knowledge
or intent, there was no mention of a plaintiff pointing out provisions
of the ADA or shouting that their ADA rights had been violated.163
Therefore, just as with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, discussed
above, the Miraglia “actual notice” rule should be understood as requiring the defendant to have knowledge of facts that present the
ADA or RA violation—with mere bureaucratic neglect not being sufficient. But this understanding of Miraglia is practically nothing differ153. Id. at 185–186 (“[S]ome evidence indicates that the plaintiffs made repeated
requests for auxiliary aids, yet DHR failed on several occasions to provide effective
aids and in some instances refused to provide an interpreter after one had been
requested.”).
154. Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2009).
155. Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of the La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 565 (5th
Cir. 2018).
156. Id. at 570.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 574.
161. Id. at 575.
162. Id. at 575–76.
163. See Perez v. Drs. Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd., 624 F. App’x 180, 185 (5th Cir.
2015) (noting that in Delano–Pyle, the plaintiff did not even request an accommodation under the ADA or RA, yet the court “concluded that the failure to provide an
effective form of communication was evidence of intentional discrimination”).
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ent from the first prong of the ordinary deliberate indifference
standard (i.e., knowledge of facts that present a substantial risk of
harm to an ADA or RA right).
As such, Miraglia would have been decided the same way had the
Fifth Circuit already expressly adopted the ordinary deliberate indifference standard. After all, simply no evidence existed such that the
state defendants knew the buildings were not compliant.164 They had
no knowledge of any substantial risk of harm to an ADA or RA right.
Thus, they could not have failed to act on knowledge that they did not
have.165
D. Cadena v. El Paso County
In Cadena v. El Paso County,166 the plaintiff was in jail and needed
a wheelchair and several other accommodations.167 She received some
accommodations, though allegedly not enough. At one point, the
wheelchair she did have was taken away.168 The relevant question
presented was whether a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the jail had intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff.169
The court held that a reasonable jury could have found that the jail
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff; thus, there was a genuine issue of material fact.170 To reach this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit noted the jail was aware of the plaintiff’s disability and of her
continued requests for an accommodation.171 Moreover, the circuit effectively held that a reasonable juror could have concluded that the
jail failed to act appropriately under these circumstances.172
Again, however, it is difficult to see how this case would have ended
any differently had the Fifth Circuit already expressly adopted ordinary deliberate indifference. Indeed, the Cadena court seemed to accept the proposition that nothing would have changed under ordinary
deliberate indifference when, after paying lip service to the possible
“something more than deliberate indifference” standard, it said, “[i]n
practice, this court has affirmed a finding of intentional discrimination
when a county deputy knew that a hearing-impaired suspect could not
164. Miraglia, 901 F.3d. at 575.
165. Id. (noting that the museum could not have acted with intent under the facts of
the case).
166. Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 717 (5th Cir. 2020).
167. Id. at 721–23.
168. Id. at 721.
169. Id. at 724.
170. Id. at 721 (An issue of material fact existed “because a reasonable jury could
find that the County intentionally denied Cadena reasonable accommodations.”).
171. Id. at 725–26 (applying intentional discrimination standard to facts of the
case).
172. Id. at 726 (“A jury could find, therefore, that its ongoing refusal to let her use
a wheelchair or to otherwise modify its policies was intentional.”).
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understand him, rendering his chosen method of communication ineffective, and the deputy made no attempt to adapt.”173 That statement
is a quintessential description of deliberate indifference. Furthermore,
the Cadena panel doubled down on describing the circuit’s past practices in terms extremely close to ordinary deliberate indifference: “[A]
plaintiff created a genuine dispute as to intentional discrimination
when the evidence indicated that ‘on several occasions, an interpreter
was requested but not provided,’ and one of the forms of communication that a hospital used to speak with a hearing-impaired patient was
often ineffective.”174
E. Smith v. Harris County
In Smith v. Harris County,175 Jacqueline Smith sued Harris County
under the ADA and RA after her son committed suicide in a county
jail.176 The question presented to the court was whether the district
court had properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on
the ground that the plaintiff could not show intentional
discrimination.177
In deciding the issue, the panel noted what had been noted by virtually all other courts: even if a plaintiff could successfully establish a
violation of the RA or ADA, the plaintiff cannot recover damages
unless the discrimination was intentional.178 Further, the panel stated
that the Fifth Circuit had yet to adopt any standard for determining
“intentional discrimination.”179
In answering the question, the panel conducted an analysis remarkably like that of the other circuits that had previously adopted ordinary deliberate indifference.180 For example, one reason why the
panel held that intentional discrimination was not present was because
the moment an officer saw that the decedent’s window was covered,
the officer acted appropriately and removed the window covering.181
In addition, the county jail tried to accommodate the decedent’s
mental illness by providing psychiatric treatment, from which he had
been discharged.182 And there was no evidence that the non-medical
staff at the county jail knew that additional accommodations were
necessary.183 Therefore, in this case, the defendants largely did not
173. Id. at 724.
174. Id. (quoting Perez v. Drs. Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd., 624 F. App’x 180, 185
(5th Cir. 2015)).
175. Smith v. Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d 311, 311 (5th Cir. 2020).
176. Id. at 314.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 318.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 318–19.
182. Id. at 319.
183. Id.
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have any knowledge of facts that presented a substantial risk of harm
to an ADA or RA right; and when they did have knowledge, the jail
personnel acted appropriately to cure those risks.184 That is nothing
higher, lower, or different from deliberate indifference used by the
other circuits.
F. Phillips ex. rel. J.H. v. Prator
In J.H. v. Prator,185 J.H. was upset, causing him to leave his special
needs classroom and “linger” in his school’s hallway.186 J.H., who was
nonverbal and had severe autism, did not want to return to class.187
Some of the school officials tried to coax him back to the classroom188
but then called a sheriff’s deputy (who was contracted to provide security for the school)189 to the scene—a standoff ensued.190 It ended
when J.H. kicked at a school administrator and the deputy responded
by firing his taser.191
The question presented in this case was whether these facts plausibly alleged an intentional failure to accommodate under the ADA.192
In holding that these allegations did plausibly allege intentional discrimination, the Fifth Circuit noted several relevant points of law: (1)
plaintiffs may sue public entities for money damages under the ADA
and RA;193 (2) plaintiffs must show that such discrimination was intentional;194 (3) the Fifth Circuit has declined to adopt any specific
standard but has often required something more than deliberate indifference;195 and (4) a defendant must have had actual notice of a violation if intent is to be found.196 Further, the court held that the conduct
of Prator, the named defendant, was not intentional.197 Rather, the
intentional actions of the sheriff’s deputy on the scene are imputed to
the sheriff’s department because the ADA and RA are vicarious liability statutes.198
Interestingly, even though no one told the officer or the school that
they were violating the ADA, the Fifth Circuit found that there were
184. See id.
185. Phillips ex rel. J.H. v. Prator, No. 20-30110, 2021 WL 3376524, at *1 (5th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2021). Given the procedural posture of this case, I have written this analysis
like the Fifth Circuit would, I assumed the alleged facts were true.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *4 (noting the Sheriff had provided in-school security).
190. Id. at *1.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *2.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *3.
197. Id. at *4.
198. Id.
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sufficient allegations of intent.199 The allegations that the Fifth Circuit
found stated a plausible claim of intentional discrimination are as follows: (1) J.H. stuck his fingers in his ears and stood motionless;200 (2)
he continued to display the obvious signs of his disability for several
minutes;201 (3) the sheriff’s deputy, after seeing this, “‘did not take
any steps to de-escalate the situation’ and instead ‘conveyed a threatening and confrontational attitude to J.H.’”;202 and (4) the sheriff’s
deputy did not attempt to further accommodate J.H. despite the clear
indications of his disability.203
But once again, it is difficult to see how this case would have turned
out differently in every other circuit that has adopted deliberate indifference. The officer knew of facts that presented a substantial risk of
harm to the plaintiff, and he failed to act appropriately on that risk.
G. The General Rule from the Fifth Circuit
Like virtually every other court, the Fifth Circuit holds that plaintiffs may obtain damages under Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the
RA by showing that the defendant’s discrimination was intentional.
Further, a plaintiff need not seek an individual policy maker’s decision
to hold an entity liable; rather, the actions of employees are imputed
to the entity because both the RA and ADA are vicarious liability
statutes. Most courts hold that deliberate indifference suffices to show
intent. The Fifth Circuit has not adopted any standard—at times saying it has no specific standard,204 and at other times saying it may have
required something more than deliberate indifference.205 In practice,
however, it has been applying an ordinary deliberate indifference
standard. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s “something more than deliberate indifference” is a game of charades that should be stopped, especially because: (1) it is at odds with decisions in virtually every other
circuit; (2) it is at odds with the text, history, and purposes of the
ADA and RA, as described in Part IV below; and (3) it is possible to
read Fifth Circuit precedent to allow explicit adoption of ordinary deliberate indifference without an en banc panel or Supreme Court
decision.
199. Id. at *5.
200. Id. at *4.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at *5 (“[W]e thus conclude that the allegations that Nunnery understood
the limitations imposed by J.H.’s autism and chose not to accommodate them ‘raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’ ” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
204. Perez v. Drs. Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd., 624 F. App’x 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2015)
(noting the court has not defined its intent standard).
205. Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of the La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 575 (5th
Cir. 2018).
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IV. WHY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SHOULD EXPLICITLY ADOPT
ORDINARY DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
This Part offers various reasons why the deliberate indifference
standard is the best theoretical and practical approach for ADA Title
II and RA damages actions. This Part functions as a revisitation of,
and an expansion upon, statements I made in my prior article, Fifth
Indifference.
A. The Purposes of the ADA and RA
The Americans with Disabilities Act is filled to the brim with textual provisions that show Congress designed the law to address discrimination that resulted not only from animus or ill will, but also
from deliberate indifference, neglect, disparate impact, and so forth.
Indeed, some such words are found in the very beginning of the Act
itself:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication
barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services,
programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.206

The word “including” necessarily means that this provision also
concerns itself with discrimination outside of “outright intentional”
discrimination. The same goes for phrases such as “discriminatory effects.” Consistent with these provisions, courts have universally declared that the ADA was meant to strengthen earlier efforts to protect
people with disabilities207 and that Congress had a “more comprehensive” view of what constitutes discrimination than conceived of in
prior statutes.208 Further still, courts have explicitly noted that both
the RA and the ADA were intended to extend beyond sheer animus.209 Put another way, courts have recognized that “[d]iscrimination
against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often
the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness
and indifference—of benign neglect.”210 With these purposes and
statements in mind, there can be little doubt that a “deliberate indif206. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
207. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 599 (1999) (recognizing
that “[t]he ADA stepped up earlier measures to secure opportunities for people with
developmental disabilities to enjoy the benefits of community living”).
208. Id. at 598 (“We are satisfied that Congress had a more comprehensive view of
the concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA.”).
209. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985); see also Chapman v. Pier 1
Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Choate’s discussion of
the enactment of the RA in relation to the ADA).
210. Choate, 469 U.S. at 295.
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ference” standard would be far more faithful to the ADA and RA
than an “animus or ill will” standard—or the Fifth Circuit’s possibly
“something more than deliberate indifference” standard.
B. The History of the ADA in Relation to the Eighth Amendment
There is an interesting intersection between the ADA and the general civil rights enforcement statute, 42 U.S.C § 1983. That intersection is the Eighth Amendment. In my experience, disability rights
plaintiffs largely abandoned constitutional arguments for statutory
ones. There is one major exception to this abandonment—prisons.
People with disabilities in prisons were long able to resort to the protections of the Eighth Amendment to largely the same degree as their
counterparts without disabilities.211 This is because prison healthcareand-conditions cases often involved high risks of injury, and such risks
were possible for people with disabilities and without. Indeed, due to
the nature of several disabilities, it appears that the Eighth Amendment may have placed special protections on those with disabling conditions.212 Furthermore, both § 1983 and the ADA enforce the Eighth
Amendment. By its terms, § 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue for violations
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.213 Title II of the ADA is
literally said to be, at times, enforcement legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment—specifically in the context of the ADA enforcing
Eighth Amendment rights.214 Importantly, the standard for bringing
an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim for damages
under § 1983 is deliberate indifference.215
The test for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment
can be summarized as (1) the prison knew of a substantial risk of harm
and (2) the prison failed to act appropriately on that risk.216 This is
virtually no different than that standard other circuits use in ADA
Title II and RA damages claims.
Recognizing that (1) § 1983 claims under the Eighth Amendment
were one of the rare areas of law where people with disabilities suc211. Derek Warden, A Worsened Discrimination: How Exacerbation of Disabilities
Constitutes Discrimination by Reason of Disability Under Title II of the ADA and
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 46 S.U. L. REV. 14, 50 (2018) (noting that the worsening of disabilities is usually considered under the Eighth Amendment).
212. Id. at 48 (noting that many courts have held that prolonged solitary confinement of those with mental illness violates the Eighth Amendment).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
214. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006).
215. See Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that § 1983
authorizes suits for money damages for violations of the Eighth Amendment); see also
id. at 1081 (noting that the standard for Eighth Amendment claims is deliberate
indifference).
216. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (“A prison official acts
with deliberate indifference ‘only if [(A)] he knows that inmates face a substantial risk
of serious bodily harm and [(B)] he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.’ ” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994))).
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ceeded and (2) the ADA was designed to step up prior laws protecting
people with disabilities, it would seem absurd to say that the ADA
requires a standard higher than that used in Eighth Amendment damages cases.
As such, the ADA and its relationship to the Eighth Amendment
strongly suggest that at most deliberate indifference should apply to
damages actions under Title II.
C. The ADA, the RA, and the Spending Clause
As noted previously, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is a precursor to Title II of the ADA. As such, the two statutes are usually
construed together because they have the same remedial schemes.217
Thus, if one could justify the deliberate indifference standard for
claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, such would also justify
the use of the deliberate indifference standard for Title II of the ADA.
As other authorities have noted, the nature and background of the
RA do, in fact, strongly suggest that the deliberate indifference standard should apply.218 This is so because the Rehabilitation Act is
neither Commerce Clause legislation nor Fourteenth Amendment legislation. It is Spending Clause legislation.219 Spending Clause legislation is often said to be bound up in contract-law principles.220 One
such principle often reflected in Spending Clause legislation is the theory of knowledge.221 In other words, just as a valid contract requires
offer and acceptance of its terms, the legitimacy of Congress’s power
to legislate under the spending power rests on whether the recipient
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.222 This
knowledge principle in Spending Clause cases has led to the generally
accepted principle that money damages (for violations of Spending
Clause-based laws) are only allowed where the entity is put on notice
that it has violated the law.223 The way this generally works under the
RA or ADA in other circuits is a defendant is on notice of facts that
present the substantial likelihood of harm to an ADA or RA right.
For example, a hospital has sufficient notice to justify liability if it is
217. See Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (explaining
that the ADA and RA have the same legal standards); Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d
795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
218. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Marion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 264–65 (3d Cir.
2013); Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 348 (11th Cir. 2012).
219. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Taylor v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 513 F.
Supp. 2d 540, 556 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
220. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 186–87; Durrell, 729 F.3d at 264–65; Liese, 701 F.3d at 347.
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aware that plaintiffs have impairments and need auxiliary aids but
fails to provide such aids after repeated requests.224
As noted above, this standard requires knowledge and not “animus” or “ill will.” Thus, it would not seem appropriate to require animus under either the RA or the ADA. In fact, any standard higher
than deliberate indifference would be inappropriate, as such a standard could require knowledge plus something else. However, a standard lower than deliberate indifference would likely not fulfill the
knowledge requirement.225 Moreover, even though an “animus” or
“ill will” standard would fulfill the knowledge requirement, the
knowledge requirement must still be measured against the backdrop
of the ADA’s history and broad remedial purposes.226
As such, the nature of the ADA’s relationship to the RA, which is
Spending Clause legislation, strongly implies that at least deliberate
indifference should be the standard applicable to ADA Title II damages actions. The other points mentioned in this Part indicate that at
most deliberate indifference should apply. Thus, the Goldilocks point
between all these interests, concerns, textual provisions, and historical
points is deliberate indifference: (1) a defendant knew of facts that
presented a substantial risk of harm to an ADA or RA right and (2)
the defendant failed to act on that risk.
D. Practical Considerations
There are several practical issues that the Fifth Circuit and lower
courts should consider when deciding whether to expressly adopt the
deliberate indifference standard for ADA and RA damages claims.227
First, simply adopting the ordinary deliberate indifference standard
for ADA and RA claims would prevent an unnecessary circuit split.
All the Fifth Circuit’s prior cases would have been decided the same
had it expressly adopted deliberate indifference anyway, so the potential “split” would be a mere verbal dispute. The courts are extremely
busy as is without an entire area of federal civil rights law being the
subject of a semantic fight among the circuit courts. The split would be
especially ridiculous because, as described above, deliberate indifference has its roots in the history, text, and purposes of the ADA—the
Fifth Circuit’s supposed “something more than deliberate indifference” simply does not.228
Second, adopting the deliberate indifference standard would save
countless dollars, hours, and stress from litigating a question that
224. See generally Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 270–71 (2d
Cir. 2009), for a discussion of such case facts.
225. Fifth Indifference, supra note 48, at 8.
226. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001).
227. These considerations became more apparent after the publication of Fifth
Indifference.
228. See discussion supra Parts II–III and Subsections IV.A–D.
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should not even need to be asked. While the current test possibly used
by the Fifth Circuit is amorphous, the deliberate indifference standard
used by the other circuits is not. As such, if the Fifth Circuit adopted
the deliberate indifference standard, parties would not need to litigate
to find what that “something more” is. Indeed, some judges on the
Fifth Circuit have tried to answer that question and can only seem to
refer to prior cases that have found sufficient “intent” without expressly adopting any test or standard.229
Third, and finally, as previously mentioned, while the Fifth Circuit
has hinted that it does not adopt deliberate indifference, by and large,
it has used that standard.230 Thus, it has led to courts either (a) applying deliberate indifference without expressly stating so231 or (b) trying
desperately to use this amorphous standard that will be overruled by
actual—though not express—application of deliberate indifference on
appeal.232 Simply adopting the deliberate indifference model will end
this vicious cycle.
Therefore, not only is the deliberate indifference standard the
“Goldilocks” point between various interests, purposes, and textual
provisions of the ADA, it is also the “Goldilocks” point between the
theoretical side of disability rights law and the various practical considerations above. There is simply no reason for the Fifth Circuit to
not openly adopt that standard for ADA and RA damages claims.
V. POSSIBLE READING TO ALLOW ADOPTION OF DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN
EN BANC PANEL
This short and final Part offers reasons why one could read prior
Fifth Circuit precedent as not necessarily rejecting the deliberate indifference standard. This would have tremendous benefit to litigants,
courts, and the law, as such. First, it would mean that lower courts
could expressly adopt and apply the deliberate indifference model I
argue for in this Article. Second, it would mean that a panel of the
Fifth Circuit would not be troubled by the rule of orderliness and
could expressly adopt deliberate indifference without the need for an
en banc panel or the Supreme Court to intervene.233 This in turn
229. Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 726 (5th Cir. 2020).
230. See discussion supra Part III.
231. As the Fifth Circuit has been doing, as noted above. Cadena, 946 F.3d at 726.
232. Such as what the district court attempted to do in Prator. J.H. ex rel. Phillips v.
Prator, No. 18-994, 2020 WL 609642, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2020), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Phillips ex rel. J.H. v. Prator, No. 20-30110, 2021 WL 3376524 (5th
Cir. Aug. 3, 2021).
233. Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008) (“It is a wellsettled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness that one panel of our court may not overturn
another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our en banc court.”).
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would speed up development of the law without unnecessary
litigation.
The first justification for this reading of Fifth Circuit precedent
comes from the discussion above. Not a single decision of the Fifth
Circuit analyzed above would have turned out differently had the
Fifth Circuit simply said it was applying deliberate indifference. Thus,
substantively, the Fifth Circuit has been applying deliberate
indifference.234
Second, one could read Delano–Pyle as effectively adopting deliberate indifference.235 In that opinion, the Fifth Circuit said that there
was no deliberate indifference standard under the ADA.236 It also
noted that intentional discrimination was required to cast a defendant
in damages.237 Further, it held that the facts of the case were sufficient
to show intentional discrimination.238 However, as explained above,
the facts of that case were deliberate indifference facts.239 Further, at
the time Delano–Pyle was decided, other circuits had expressly
adopted or approvingly cited “deliberate indifference,” but the Fifth
Circuit did not analyze those cases.240 As such, it would be nigh absurd to say that the Fifth Circuit made such an important circuit split
without an iota of analysis. Thus, Delano–Pyle should be read as saying the generally understood rule that there is no deliberate indifference standard applicable to the ADA as a whole, but if one wants
damages, they must show intentional discrimination. Such intentional
discrimination can be established by a showing of deliberate
indifference.241
Third, as noted above, some panels have said they were using something more than deliberate indifference; others have only said that our
circuit has “seemed” to require something more. This may present a
split within the same circuit. However, because these decisions would
have turned out the same had they adopted deliberate indifference
anyway, these statements of “something more than deliberate indifference” as opposed to “seem to have required something more than
deliberate indifference” could potentially be read as dicta; thus, they
are not binding on courts and panels that wish to expressly adopt deliberate indifference. Granted, with each passing year or statement by
the Fifth Circuit, this last argument becomes less persuasive.
234. See discussion supra Part III.
235. Fifth Indifference, supra note 48, at 10–11.
236. Delano–Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See discussion supra Part III.
240. See Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001); Powers v.
MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999); Bartlett v. N.Y. State
Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S.
1031 (1999); Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 830 n.9 (4th Cir. 1994).
241. See Fifth Indifference, supra note 48, at 11.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, I ask the judges of the Fifth Circuit and lower
courts to explicitly adopt the deliberate indifference standard for damages actions under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA.
That standard is (1) a defendant knew of facts that presented a substantial risk of harm to an ADA or RA right and (2) the defendant
failed to act appropriately on that risk. District court judges or the
individual appellate panels could adopt deliberate indifference by
reading prior precedent in such a way as to allow explicit adoption of
that standard. Otherwise, an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit may be
required to undo the semantic errors of prior Fifth Circuit cases. Either way, the Fifth Circuit’s current wording of “something more than
deliberate indifference” should be abandoned. It is a charade that is
applied no differently than ordinary “deliberate indifference” in the
other circuits. It presents a possible unnecessary circuit split on an important feature of sweeping federal civil rights laws. It leads to confusion and unnecessary litigation. Finally, and most importantly, it is
simply wrong because it is anathema to the history, purposes, and text
of the ADA and RA.
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